We employ a detailed two-stage model to simulate the operation of the Central Eastern European electricity market and network. Implementing different cases of coordination in congestion management between national transmission system operators, numerical results show the beneficial impact of closer cooperation. Specific steps comprise the sharing of network and dispatch information, cross-border counter-trading, and multilateral redispatch in a flowbased congestion management framework. Efficiency gains are accompanied by distributional effects. Closer economic cooperation becomes especially relevant against the background of changing spatial generation patterns, deeper international integration of national systems, and spillovers of national developments to adjacent systems.
INTRODUCTION
3 case of nodal pricing. Irrespective of market areas, however, coordination issues between countries or zones remain to be resolved. Concerning the economic treatment of cross-border coordination, the literature identified cost savings from a transition to a full-fledged nodal pricing system, incorporating all network constraints in the market clearing process (Kunz, 2012; Neuhoff et al., 2013) . Chaves-Avila et al. (2014) analyze that increased coordination, taking account of cross-zonal balancing issues in Germany, can reduce flawed incentives toward undue arbitrage behavior. More generally, Brunekreeft (2015) discusses efficiency gains from less fragmentation along the electricity value chain in Europe. From a methodological point of view, the coordination congestion management is analyzed by . The authors develop a Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) model to disentangle the responsibility of relieving line overflows between different players. Applications in and Oggioni and Smeers (2013) put forward that a higher degree of coordination can increase redispatch efficiency. Kunz and Zerrahn (2015) further elaborate on welfare gains from coordinating congestion management. They show that shared responsibility between German TSOs has the potential to substantially reduce costs by access to cheaper units.
While the bulk of the literature either focuses on intra-national congestion management, or addresses international issues from the perspective of integrating network constraints into market clearing, there is little academic evidence on cross-border coordination of congestion management. This paper fills that gap. We provide an in-depth analysis detailing cases of coordination, and highlighting the benefits of different instances of increased cooperation. To this end, we set up a two-stage model of the electricity system in our study region, comprising Austria (AT), the Czech Republic (CZ), Germany (DE), Poland (PL), and Slovakia (SK). The short-run stochastic unit commitment and dispatch model stELMOD (Abrell and Kunz, 2015) creates a market dispatch and determines the resulting physical electricity flows.
Extending the work by Kunz and Zerrahn (2015) , we implement different cases of coordination between national TSOs, and isolate the benefits of closer cooperation. In this respect, we vary the scope of national responsibilities, the balancing area, and the implicit auction mechanism for cross-border capacities.
The central result is in line with intuition: more coordination enhances efficiency. In this respect, particularly the sharing of information about the network and dispatch status between national TSOs can considerably lower redispatch volumes. Moreover, liquid intra-day markets, enabling cross-border 5 counter-trading, and multilateral redispatch actions (MRAs), implemented in a flow-based congestion management setting, can levy further benefits. At the same time, redistributional effects between countries do exist and can be large. While results provide quantitative evidence for the study area, qualitative insights apply to other regions. Particularly, we picked our study region for two reasons: first, its electricity markets are already closely connected and further integration is envisaged. Second, the issue of loop flows from northern Germany to Bavaria and Austria, putting pressure on the Polish and Czech systems, is subject to controversial debate 4 . Therefore, it provides an interesting and politically relevant application.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model formulation and describes the cases of coordination as well as the underlying data. Section 3 reports on the results and discusses their significance. Section 4 concludes and outlines avenues for future research.
MODEL FORMULATION
The general structure of our numerical model resembles the current European spot market design, consisting of a day-ahead market with uniform pricing and a subsequent curative congestion management phase. The day-ahead or spot market accounts for transmission limitations only on international crossborder trade. Internal physical network restrictions are considered outside the spot market in the congestion management approach by the responsible TSO (Kunz, 2012) .
To this end, we employ two distinct models: the spot market is modeled as a cost minimization problem, where cross-border transmission lines are represented by a transportation model. The model accounts for both commitment and dispatch of individual generation units and is optimized for an entire year using a rolling planning approach. Key results are the schedules of generation units and international exchanges. Based on these data, the congestion management is carried out, reflecting different cases of international coordination. Importantly, both stages of the model are not connected by any kind of feed-6 back mechanism. In the following, we reduce our model description to the most relevant aspects. A detailed account of the spot market model can be found in Abrell and Kunz (2015) .
The Spot Market Model
The spot market model minimizes total system cost (1) consisting of generation and startup cost.
The market clearing constraint (2) ensures the zonal balance of residual load, conventional generation, pumped-hydro generation and pumping, as well as international exchanges. Conventional generation levels are restricted by minimum and maximum capacities in case the unit is operating (3). Pumped-hydro storages are characterized by their maximum generation, pumping, and storage capacities. The spot market model abstracts from congestion within countries, whereas exchanges between different market zones (countries) are restricted by the available commercial trading capacity (4), the net transfer capacity
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The Congestion Management Model
The congestion management model determines the redispatch of generation units given the received spot market schedules. In case physical network capacities do not suffice to accommodate the pattern of electrical flows, redispatch is carried out. Redispatch describes the increase or decrease of spot market generation and is performed in a cost-minimizing fashion considering the physical characteristics of the transmission network. Thus, a plant that increases generation is compensated by the transmission 7 system operator for additional costs, whereas a plant that decreases generation must refund its saved generation cost. The physical load flow is calculated using a DC load flow approach, where we abstract from transmission losses (Leuthold et al., 2012) . The general formulation of the model is given below -a detailed description of the congestion management issue and the model formulation can be found in Kunz (2012) and Abrell and Kunz (2015) .
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Cases of Coordinating Congestion Management
Electrical flows depend on the technical properties of the entire transmission network. Thus, a certain fraction of a transaction flows on the direct link between both transaction points, whereas the remaining fraction follows alternative routes. Nodal in-feeds and withdrawals, thus, have widespread implications on transmission flows in highly meshed electricity systems. While continental Europe is linked by a synchronous transmission network, the system is characterized by a patchwork of different, mostly national, TSOs, electricity market specifications, and national jurisdictions. A perfectly coordinated approach to congestion management thus would require, among others, an intensive sharing of information and common network management approaches.
We define four cases of cross-country coordination, which differ in the degree of information sharing, the access to cross-country redispatch capacities, the geographical balancing areas, and the mode of cross-country allocation of network capacities for redispatch. Specifically, we analyze two limiting cases: no coordination (Case 1) and perfect coordination including multilateral redispatch actions (Case 4). In between, we take information sharing, for which actual vehicles exist by 2015 5 , into account (Case 2), as well as possibilities for cross-border counter-trading (Case 3).
Case 1: Uncoordinated Congestion Management without Information Sharing
This first case has a purely national focus. Any cross-border sharing of information on transmission flows or responsibility is absent. To this end, we introduce equation (9) which imposes a national balance of redispatch actions and disallows contribution of redispatch options from neighboring countries.
Moreover, we restrict the TSOs' responsibility to their own control area. We reformulate the optimization problem to a Generalized-Nash-Equilibrium (GNE) with different exogenous valuations of 9 transmission capacity constraints. We follow the approach developed by and apply the formulation described in Kunz and Zerrahn (2015) . To this end, a separate objective function, parallel to (5), and separate constraints (6-8), are set up for each national TSO 6 , and access to plants in a country is only allowed for the respective TSO. At the same time, national TSOs target their redispatch actions solely to alleviate congestion in their own control area and directly connected cross-border lines.
Information on neighboring electricity systems remains hidden to them. In that way, coordination is restricted.
Case 2: Coordinated Congestion Management with Information Sharing
The second case introduces coordination by revealing information on neighboring electricity systems. In this way, the effects of its own actions on adjacent systems are known for each TSO, or some entity coordinating its actions. Formally, the valuation of all network constraints is now identical across all countries, and the complete network information as well as its equal valuation is taken into account in the minimization. At the same time, each region has to keep up its energy balance, as imposed by equation (9). The mathematical formulation comprises equations (5-9), as given above, where the single objective function for one supra-national entity (5) can be regarded as equivalent to the coordination case between TSOs described above.
Case 3: Coordinated Congestion Management with Counter-Trading
Beyond information sharing, the third case introduces access to redispatch capacities in neighboring countries through counter-trading. In this respect, counter-trading means that redispatch capacities can be exchanged across countries, for example in intraday markets, to counterbalance own redispatch actions. This is formally achieved by abandoning the national energy balance (9) and instead introducing an augmented version (10) to the initial problem (5-8). Cross-border market transactions are upper bounded by the available net transfer capacity and the corresponding spot market schedules as required by equation (11).
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Case 4: Coordinated Congestion Management with Multilateral Redispatch Actions
The fourth case represents perfect coordination among national TSOs and extends the access to neighboring redispatch capacities through the introduction of multilateral redispatch actions. While in the previous case cross-country redispatch is restricted to counter-trading, limited by market-related NTCs, multilateral redispatch actions, which are typically performed outside the market, are limited by the physical transmission capacity. This case therefore reflects either a single TSOs optimizing the entire transmission network, or equivalently a set of national TSOs with perfect information sharing and common network management procedures. As actual physical cross-border network capacities, instead of calculatory NTCs, are applied, this case can also be described as flow-based congestion management. To restrict re-optimization beyond congestion management, we allow redispatch only in hours in which some link in the network is subject to congestion, and add equation (12), disallowing positive profits. Formally, equations (5-8) and (12) characterize the mathematical problem.
Data
Our application focuses on congestion management in the central eastern European region, covering Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Austria. These countries are considered on a detailed level regarding generation units and transmission infrastructure. To account for international exchanges and flows, the remaining European countries are modeled on nationally aggregated levels. A 11 detailed description of the underlying data is given in Egerer et al. (2014) . In contrast to this, our dataset is calibrated to the year 2013; further adjustments are described in the following.
Generation is differentiated between non-dispatchable renewable and dispatchable conventional technologies. For solar PV and wind power, we apply hourly feed-in time series for 2013. For Germany, the time series are derived from national TSOs (50Hertz, 2015; Amprion, 2015; TenneT, 2015; TransnetBW, 2015) . For all other countries, re-analysis weather data is used (ECMWF, 2015) . Renewable generation enters the model at zero marginal costs, but can be curtailed at cost of 75 Euro/MWh. For conventional generation, we differentiate between generation technologies and fuels, which are characterized by different technical specifications such as efficiency, minimum generation and operating times. The assumptions on minimum generation and operating times follow Abrell and Kunz (2015) .
Marginal generation costs of conventional units are based on fuel and CO 2 certificate prices for 2013.
Electrical load is considered as a fixed and price-inelastic hourly demand. Profiles are extracted from
ENTSO-E (2015a).
The transmission network includes the high-voltage level of 220 and 380 kV and comprises 1397 transmission circuits and 681 substations. To capture interactions with electricity systems in neighboring countries, an aggregated PDTF matrix is determined. We first calculate the PTDF matrix for the entire ENTSO-E network and then aggregate the network in neighboring European countries. To this end, neighboring countries are connected to the detailed network of the investigated region through an equivalent network with lower level of detail. This approach allows to approximate the impact of neighboring electricity systems on load flows in the detailed network. In contrast, the spot market model relies on a transportation model of the transmission network, which reflects commercial transactions rather than physical load flows. Commercial transactions are bounded by NTCs, for which we employ hourly day-ahead values for 2013 for the study region, based on CAO (2015) . For other European countries, net transfer capacities are considered on a yearly basis (ENTSO-E, 2015b).
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As described in Section 2, our modelling approach comprises two steps. First, spot market dispatch and unit commitment based on transactional trade-flows between market zones, where zones reflect countries, except for the single German-Austrian market area. Given the spot market commitments, congestion management measures are evaluated in a second step with differing levels of coordination between market zones. It is important to note that the spot market commitments are identical throughout the different congestion management cases to ensure comparability of the congestion management cases.
In the following, we will first describe the spot market results and subsequently present and discuss the results of the congestion management cases.
Spot market dispatch and congestion patterns
The spot market generation pattern basically resembles the European electricity market in 2013. The spatial generation pattern has two implications for flows in the European transmission network. First, the transmission network is often insufficient to transport that energy, which results in an increasing number of congestion situations. Congestion management measures are thus necessary to reduce individual line overloading to ensure secure network operation. Second, loop flows in adjacent electricity systems extend this need also to neighboring countries as additional congestion issues and management needs can arise. and unit commitment yields total cost savings of 102 million Euro, compared to the NTC-based spot market dispatch with national copperplate assumptions. As this paper focuses on the beneficial impacts of improving coordination in a separated congestion management phase, we do not pursue this thread further.
Figure 5. Total Congestion management cost in million Euro, broken down into components
The redispatching of plants accounts for the biggest share among congestion management costs.
Particularly, the bulk of the savings accrues from reduced expenses for fuel. scenarios, it adds less than 0.5% to total costs, in the coordinated case with information sharing (Case 2) 2.5%. As it is unlikely that, in an ever more integrated electricity system, no coordination at all is implemented, we regard Case 1 as a theoretical limiting case. However, the high level of unmatched load and curtailment of renewables highlights the importance of coordination in network operation to increase security of supply in the European transmission system. The effect of coordination on the total redispatch volume is not monotone, see Table 2 . The total negative redispatch volume for the uncoordinated GNE case (Case 1) amounts to about 5.6 TWh. Moving to an integrated optimization with information sharing, Case 2, effects of generation changes are taken into account for the entire network, and redispatch volumes accordingly decrease to 3.1 TWh. Widening the energy balancing area by allowing for cross-border counter-trading yields a lower redispatch volume of 2.8 TWh in Case 3. Allowing for MRAs in a flow-based redispatch setup, Case 4, enables a greater set of feasible actions, and increases the volume to 3.8 TWh.
Combining the two patterns to calculate the specific costs indicates efficiency gains in a common metric. Specific costs are defined as costs for redispatch and renewable curtailment divided by the negative redispatch volume, thus disregarding load curtailment. 7 They can be interpreted as the average costs for relieving a unit of overload on a transmission link. The right column of Table 2 gives an overview of the specific costs in Euro per MWh. Inspection highlights two channels through which efficiency gains from coordination arise: a volume and specific cost-effect. We discuss below how both effects relate to the different steps toward more coordination.
Common Responsibility and Information Sharing -Cases 1 and 2
The volume effect is isolated when moving from the uncoordinated GNE Case 1, with five independent TSOs responsible for their own control area, to Case 2, with appropriate information sharing of congestion for the entire region. The latter case is equivalent to a single TSO operating the network in the entire region, however subject to zonal balance restrictions. While specific costs decrease moderately, from 55 to 43 Euro per MWh, total costs drop by more than half to 138 million Euro. Savings thus arise mostly from the utilization of a lower number of units, where the negative redispatch volume decreases by 2.5 TWh.
The channel through which lower redispatch volumes and costs arise is the sharing of information.
When moving from Case 1 to 2, five TSOs are replaced by one entity with information for the entire study region. Congestion in one country can thus be removed by drawing on resources in another country. At the same time, the information sharing between regions prevents that redispatch in one country may create new congestion in the system of an adjacent region. Access to these substantial efficiency gains requires a 19 common information infrastructure on operational network data across borders. Each national TSO should have the information on the congestion situation, availability of resources and network topology in all countries. In this way, effects of its own orders on adjacent systems could be assessed, and those remedial actions in the network could be identified which relieve congestion in a more efficient way, wherever they are best undertaken. In this regard, it is irrelevant whether multiple TSOs coordinate on optimal measures, or one superordinate entity provides a redispatch plan for the entire region, as modeled in our Case 2.
In the European context, operational data is commonly exchanged among TSOs through, for example, daily day-ahead and hourly intraday congestion forecasts by TSO co-operations like TSC and CORESO. Thus, TSOs are regularly informed about network restrictions on a European scale and can incorporate them into their operational planning. As information sharing does take place to a certain extent, the uncoordinated Case 1 can therefore be seen as a limiting scenario to shed light on the gains of a common information pool from an academic perspective.
Proposition I
Cross-border coordination in congestion management by sharing information for the entire region substantially reduces costs, as resources in all countries can be used to remove overflows in any country.
Moreover, information sharing prevents redispatch which induces new network congestion beyond a coordinated optimum. Efficiency gains mainly arise through lower redispatch volumes.
Counter-trading and Cross-border Balancing -Cases 2 and 3
Case 3 introduces cross-border counter-trading. National TSOs can order generation increases in an adjacent country to set off decreases in their own country. All cross-border actions are limited by the available NTC after spot market clearing. As a direct effect, the total volume of congestion management measures decreases, from 3.1 TWh to 2.8 TWh, as alterations within one country do not have to be balanced within the country, but cross-border redispatch can set each other off. The slight decrease in total volume is accompanied by a substantial drop in total costs, from 138 to 81 million Euro. Specific costs thus fall from 43 to 29 Euro per MWh, attributed to both less redispatch and renewables curtailment. At the same time, cross-border counter-trading has implications on the regional distribution of redispatch 20 measures across countries. Figure 6 visualizes the absolute volumes of positive and negative redispatch by country. While these are roughly equal within each country under Cases 1 and 2, except for small deviations due to load curtailment, they deviate greatly in Case 3. 
Proposition II
An enlargement of the balancing area for congestion management can yield a substantial decrease in specific redispatch costs. It prevents costly energy balancing measures within each country, and instead opens access to the cheapest alternatives. Liquid intraday markets and administrative adjustments are the prerequisites.
Flow-based Cross-border Redispatch with -Cases 3 and 4
Case 4 abandons the NTC limitations for cross-border redispatch and instead determines the scope of cross-country congestion management based on physically available capacities. We term this degree of flexibility flow-based congestion management, as an underlying grid model captures the physically feasible cross-border electricity flows. Intuitively, the total redispatch volume increases, from 2.8 to 3.8
TWh, while total costs fall from 81 to 70 million Euro. The greater flexibility in exploiting cross-border network capacities enables access to further cheaper units for generation upshifts which replace the upshift of more expensive national units. Accordingly, specific costs drop from 29 to 19 Euro per MWh.
When interpreting results, a caveat applies: in Case 4, costs for congestion management can be interpreted as lower bound. This is due to the model setup allowing a certain degree of re-optimization:
consider a case in which some line within a country is congested and the capacity of cross-border links is not fully exploited. If the spot market dispatch is subject to NTC market coupling and commercial flows result in physical flows below the actual cross-border capacity limit, then the spot market does not necessarily deliver the least-cost dispatch subject to physical line capacities. In the redispatch phase, thus, generation adjustments may not only relieve overflows, but also achieve a lower cost market clearing expost. In Case 4, this effect can be present, but it is restricted by two constraints. First, in hours without any congestion, redispatch is prohibited. Second, if redispatch occurs, then total costs may not be lower than under the spot market dispatch, implemented by the zero profit condition equation (12). At most, positive redispatch costs may be countervailed.
It is, however, difficult to disentangle to which extent re-optimization drives coordination gains.
To give some assessment, we relax both constraints and calculate the limiting case exploiting the full re- 
Proposition III
Flow-based allocation of cross-border network capacities for redispatch and coordinated multilateral redispatch actions substantially decrease total costs. The greater flexibility enables access to cheaper generation, which was kept out by the more restrictive NTC mechanism. In such setting, also reoptimization beyond targeting network congestion is possible.
Distribution of Congestion Management Costs
The analysis of total costs highlights the overall gains from coordination. As multiple countries are involved, also the distributional perspective is of great relevance when it comes to incentives for further integration. Table 3 shows how total costs, excluding load curtailment, are distributed across countries.
Here, costs for redispatch are assigned to that country where the corresponding generation unit is located. line is subject to congestion, we conservatively share the volume equally between countries. In Figure 7 , the first bar within each country section indicates the share of a country in total congestion of the region:
87% of all congested network elements are located within Germany, 9% in Poland, and 4% in Austria, where for both countries these are mainly cross-border lines to Germany. In Case 2, congestion volume shares, represented by the second bar within each country section, roughly correspond to the redispatch cost shares. By introducing cross-border counter-trading, however, a substantial part of congestion management costs is transferred to Austria and Czech Republic, see Cases 3 and 4. Results thus indicate that in a multilateral context, such as the European electricity system, the spatial structure of redispatch actions and corresponding costs do not necessarily coincide with congestion events. This effect becomes even more important with higher degrees of coordination as envisaged by European policy. This uneven distribution of costs and benefits across countries may hamper incentives for closer cooperation. In the context of our results, Germany would have a strong incentive for closer cooperation in congestion management due to high coordination profits. On the other hand, Austria, Czech Republic, and Poland face higher costs in the coordinated cases than in the more national oriented Case 2 which may limit the willingness to coordinate on operational measures. What is thus needed to increase cooperation, is a mechanism to allocate congestion management costs in line with benefits on a national level. Among others, potential allocation mechanisms could follow the requesters-pay-principle or some network usage metric. However, how a particular cost allocation mechanism could be designed, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Proposition IV
Total cost savings are accompanied by considerable distributional effects. Particularly, countries in which more expensive generators are located gain from closer coordination while countries with cheaper generation lose. To align costs and benefits of coordinating cross-border congestion management, prudent mechanisms are required.
CONCLUSIONS
The reshaping of the European electricity generation structure poses new challenges on the electricity network. In the short run, congestion management through redispatch of power plants is a suitable means to maintain network stability. At the same time, European markets integrate ever closer. In this paper, we applied a large-scale model to the Central Eastern European region to shed light on the question whether and how the cross-border coordination of congestion management can be beneficial. The central result is in line with intuition: closer cooperation increases cost-efficiency by access to cheaper facilities.
Particularly, the sharing of network information between national TSOs has the potential to considerably reduce redispatch volumes. Likewise, counter-trading, facilitated by liquid intra-day markets can decrease specific costs, and multilateral redispatch actions in a flow-based setting can levy further efficiency gains from coordination. At the same time, redistributional effects between countries can be large. Therefore, 26 prudent cross-border cost allocation schemes are required to ensure incentive compatibility for all countries.
Several limitations and caveats remain. The questions how to sharply disentangle genuine coordination gains from re-optimization potential within the model mechanics, and how to implement modes of cooperation other than analyzed here, pose starting points for fruitful future research. Moreover, it remains open in this paper how market-based congestion management mechanism could provide additional benefits. Likewise, the question which allocation cost principles could reliably implement an incentive compatible mechanism for all parties remain to be investigated.
In this respect, the European Commission fosters a discussion about how to design closer cooperation between countries in the field of cross-border congestion management. While several coordination initiatives, like Coreso, TSC, or CAO (Capacity Allocation Office) exist, the CACM Network Code envisages the binding enactment of common rules and regulations. Our paper has shown that considerable welfare gains are indeed possible.
